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Introduction
The dual income tax is characterized by a progressive tax on earned income and a proportional tax on capital income. This tax system was first implemented in the Nordic countries nearly 20 years ago, and countries around the world have since then implemented elements of a dual income tax. 4 The dual income tax is neutral in its treatment of different sorts of capital income. In its pure form, it also avoids double taxation of dividends, as dividend receipts are tax-exempt through an imputation system. The major challenge lies with the taxation of small businesses. For medium and high income classes, there is a large difference in the marginal tax rates on capital and labour income, providing great incentives for business owners to participate in tax minimizing income shifting in order to re-classify labour income as capital income, as emphasized by Sørensen (1994) , Hagen and Sørensen (1998), Lindthe et.al (2004) , and Alstadsaeter (2007) .
The prevention of such income shifting was a major motivation behind the Norwegian 2006 tax reform, which introduced a partial double taxation of dividends paid to individual domestic shareholders. Only the equity premium is subject to taxation under this new system.
The normal return to the share, the so-called Rate-of-Return-Allowance, is tax exempt. We show in a simple setting with no uncertainty that in steady state, the shareholder income tax is neutral with respect to timing of dividends and capital structure of the firm. Sørensen (2005a) also shows that the shareholder income tax is neutral with respect to investment decisions and risk taking, as long as there is full loss offset.
So, with neutrality under both the new and old tax systems, the tax reform should have no other effect than on the timing of dividend payments. 5 As the reform was announced in advance and a number of transitionary rules were implemented from 2004 and onward, corporations were expected to advance the distribution of profits prior to the implementation of the new tax rates. Following the hierarchy of Slemrod (1995) , this is intertemporal income shifting, the least severe of agents' behavioral responses to taxation, and should not have any significant effects except transitory disturbances on the financial policy of the corporations. But, as stated by Korinek and Stiglitz (2008) , intertemporal income shifting affects the cash 4 For more on the dual tax system, see Sørensen (1994 Sørensen ( , 1998 Sørensen ( , 2005b , Nielsen and Sørensen (1997), and Boadway (2004) . 5 We would also expect some minor effects of the ratio of wage to dividends in the compensation of owners' labour effort in small firms where the owner also is actively involved in the day-to-day operations. An owner-manager's choice between wages and dividends is analyzed by Fjaerli and Lund (2001) . 6 See also Gordon and Slemrod (2000) for a broad discussion of different types of income shifting.
3 balance of the corporation and might thus have negative effects on investments in the following periods.
In this paper we examine a panel of 75.433 Norwegian non-listed corporations' dividend policy based on their annual accounting statements for the accounting years [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . In addition, we have information on their type of owners, ownership shares, and owners' received dividends. We also analyze which impact excessive dividend payments prior to the 2006 tax reform had on the corporations' financial structure. We have three main results. First, we find strong timing effect on dividend payments, both around the temporary dividend tax in 2001 and around the announced and permanent shareholder income tax in 2006. Aggregate proposed dividends in our sample increased by 82 percent the last year before the introduction of the shareholder income tax, and dropped by 41 percent after the reform. In particular, there are strong responses on the extensive margin, which are the same results found by Chetty and Saez (2005) . But this timing effect is substantially smaller in firms where the owners transferred their shares to holding companies prior to 2006, as dividends paid to corporations are tax exempt under the shareholder income tax. Second, we find support for the life-cycle view of the corporation, as argued by Sinn (1991) . In our sample, mature firms are more likely to pay dividends. High asset growth in a corporation increases the probability of retaining all earnings. These effects are even stronger when considering the probability of paying excessive dividends (proposed dividends are higher than profits). The very significant impact of growth on the propensity to retain all earnings indicates that internal funding can be of special importance for growing firms. Tax motivated dividend distributions could therefore have an additional cost through reduced cash holdings and thus reduced investment opportunities in the future, as argued by Korinek and Stiglitz (2008) . Third, we find that intertemporal shifting of income through the timing of dividends drains the corporations for internal equity and increases their debt-equity ratios. This effect is more pronounced in the smaller corporations with concentrated ownership.
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A partial double taxation of dividend income was introduced also in Finland in 2005, as an addition to their dual income tax system. The anticipation effects of this reform are analyzed in Kari, Karikallio and Pirttilä (2008) . They document an increased dividend payout prior to the reform by firms that most likely would be affected by the new dividend tax. It seems like this increase in dividend payments did not come at the expense of new 4 investments, but rather was financed partially by new debt. The effects of the dual income tax on related issues as taxable income, demand for debt, tax progressivity, and choice of business organizational form, are studied by Aarbu and Thoresen (2001) , Fjaerli (2004) , Thoresen (2004) , Thoresen and Alstadsaeter (2008) , and Alstadsaeter and Wangen (2008) on Norwegian data. Similar studies are conducted on Swedish data by Selén (2002) and Hansson (2004) , and on Finnish data by Kari (1999) and Pirttilä and Selin (2006) . Different theories on the corporation's motivation for distributing dividends, as well as the effects of taxes, are presented in section 2 in this paper. The previous and present taxation of the Norwegian corporate sector are described in section 3, where also the neutrality of the shareholder tax is discussed. Section 4 presents the data, and in section 5 we present the empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
Theories on the effects of taxes on corporations' financial policy
Different views on the motives behind the corporation's dividend payments lead to different conclusions regarding the effect of taxes on the corporations' financial policy. According to the familiar early results of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Miller and Modigliani (1961) , dividend policy and the source of finance are irrelevant for share value in efficient markets.
But market imperfections, such as agency costs and taxes introduce distortions.
Under the agency problem of free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986) , firms increase dividend payments when they anticipate declining investment opportunities in the future. It is a way to control managers from investing in less profitable internal projects and waste cash in more mature firms with limited growth possibilities. Lintner (1956) found in a survey that managers only increase dividends when they are sure to be able to maintain future dividend payments of this level. This is the starting point of the signaling view on dividend payments, where dividends can signal private information on profitability. Firms are reluctant to cut dividend payments, as this is perceived as a negating signal of rentability to the market. A large literature finds evidence that stock prices increase for corporations that announce dividend increases and fall when corporations announce 7 This paper focuses on possible indirect tax reform effects on investments through income shifting and consequences for cash balance. Anticipated tax reforms can also affect investments directly, as emphasized by Alvarez et al. (1998) . 5 dividend cuts.
8 Bernheim and Wantz (1995) argue that taxes make dividends more expensive as a signal. Thus the signal of profitability inherent in dividend payments is stronger in the presence of taxes.
More recent views on dividend payments are the clientele view, where investors prefer dividend paying stocks from behavioral explanations (see Allen and Michaely, 2003 , for an overview), and the catering view, where managers pay dividends when dividend-paying stocks are in demand, and not when it is the other way round (Baker and Wurgler, 2004) .
Under the so called old view (or corporate finance view) on dividend taxation, new share issues is the marginal source of funds. Dividend taxes in combination with corporate taxes impose a double taxation of dividend income and makes debt more attractive as a source of finance. Dividend taxes distort the investment decision of the firm and might prevent free allocation of capital in the economy, as argued by Harberger (1962 Harberger ( , 1966 . The corporate tax discriminates against investments in the corporate sector and allocates capital towards the non-corporate sector, implying a welfare loss through an inefficient resource allocation. It can also prevent the founding of new firms.
In contrast, under the new view (or trapped equity view) on dividend taxation developed by King (1974) , Auerbach (1979) , Bradford (1981) , double taxation of dividends does not necessarily distort the firm's investment decision. Retained earnings are the marginal source of finance and dividends are paid with the residual cash flow. Repurchasing of shares is not possible. The dividend tax is neutral regarding the marginal investment decision in steady state but it imposes a proportional reduction in the marked value of equity. The dividend tax can thus be distortionary when it comes to raising new equity capital. An announced dividend tax cut has no effect on dividend payments, given that is perceived as permanent. But if the tax cut is perceived as temporary, this will spur intertemporal income shifting through the timing of dividends. The nucleous view (Sinn, 1991) builds on a life-cycle view of the firm with three phases; start-up, growth, and maturity. The dividend tax reduces initial investments in a startup-firm and slows down the growth rate, thus prolonging the middle phase in the life-cycle of the firm (where only retained earnings are used for financing expansion), and postponing the mature, dividend-paying phase. Dividend taxation is neutral when the firm is mature, in line with the new view, but creates distortions in growth firms, in line with the old view.
8 See Allen and Michaely (2003) for an overview. 9 See Auerbach (2003) for an overview on the different views on the effect of dividend taxation on corporate policy.
6 Korinek and Stiglitz (2008) build on the life-cycle view of Sinn (1991) and also allow the firms to transfer financial assets between periods. Growth firms are assumed to be capital constrained and reliant on some level of cash holdings. They find that unanticipated dividend tax change has only small effects on aggregate investments, as investments are financed through retained earnings in growing firms that do not pay dividends. An announced tax change will on the other hand induce firms to participate in intertemporal income shifting through the timing of dividend payments. This will affect the firm's cash holdings and in turn its investment level. They argue that even short-term timing effects can have long term real effects on the economy through the effect on the cash holding in credit constrained firms.
Similarly, Gordon and Dietz (2009) There is a large, but inconclusive, empirical literature analyzing the effects of dividend tax on the firms' financial policy. Poterba and Summers (1985) find support for the old view on UK data, as do Hines (1996) and Poterba (2004) on US data. Bond, Devereux and Klemm (2007) find support for the new view on recent UK data. Auerbach and Hasset (2002) and Desai and Goolsbee (2004) find some support for the new view on U.S. data. Chetty and Saez (2005) conduct an early analysis of the 2003 US dividend tax cut, and find a large timing effect of dividend payments among the listed corporations that constituted their data sample.
The rapid increase in dividend payments was stronger among firms with high levels of accumulated assets and firms with strong owners. As they argue in Chetty and Saez (2007) , this is more in line with an agency cost model of dividend behavior. Hasset (2006, 2007) document that the 2003 U.S. dividend tax cut affected equity markets and firm valuation, with a positive effect on firm value of dividend paying firms.
There also seems to be an overall trend that fewer firms are paying dividends. Fama and French (2001) find that there is a substantial decline in the proportion of US listed firms that pay dividends. DeAngelo et al. (2004) also find evidence that the reduction in dividends is primarily driven by fewer firms paying dividends. This is due to a changing composition of corporations, and that dividend payments are concentrated among the largest, most profitable listed US corporations. Some support for this is found by Denis and Osobov (2008) on international data. 
The Norwegian dual income tax system
The Norwegian version of the dual income tax involves a flat, basic tax rate that applies to both corporate income, and to capital and labour income at the personal level. The basic tax rate that applies to all income has been fixed at 28 percent in the whole period after the introduction of this scheme in 1992. In addition, labour income is taxed by a progressive surtax, which implies that top marginal tax rates for wage incomes are substantially higher than the marginal tax rate on capital income. There were strong incentives to shift income from the labour income tax base to the capital income tax base. The split model of dual income taxation was designed to prevent this income shifting, and it applied to sole proprietors and corporations with more than 2/3 of shares held by active owners. 12 Under the split model, a return to the labour effort of the active owner is imputed, and this is taxed as labour income independently of whether it is actually paid as wages, dividends, or retained in the firm. First, the imputed return to capital is calculated, at an annually determined imputation rate (this has varied between 10 and 16 10 These employers' social security contributions actually vary geographically between 0 and 14.1 percent, and are lower for employees living further away from urban centers. In this paper we only consider the normal rate of 14.1 in calculations. As these contributions are deductible labour costs when taxable profits on corporate level are calculated, they only account for additional 14.1*0.72=10.15 percentage points to total marginal tax on wage income. 11 In principle, dividends were taxable at the capital income tax rate, 28 percent. But a full imputation system allowed deduction for taxes paid at the corporate level. As the corporate tax rate is also 28 percent, this meant that in practice there was no taxation of dividend income. 12 An owner is characterized as active if he works more than 300 hours annually in the firm. Spouses or under-aged children of active owners are not recognized as passive owners. Originally, also children of age could not be considered passive 8 percentage points) times total assets in the firm. A deduction for the human capital contribution to profits is calculated as 20 percent of total wage costs, with some restrictions. Imputed return to labour is then taxable profits net of both the imputed return to capital and the human capital deduction and taxable imputed return to labour are assigned to the active owners according to their ownership shares in the firm. If imputed return to labour is negative, it is forwarded for deduction against future positive imputed return to labour in the same corporation. The split model and the incentives for income shifting are described and analyzed by Hagen and Sørensen (1998) , Lindhe et al. (2004) , Alstadsaeter (2007) , Alstadsaeter and Wangen (2008) and Thoresen and Alstadsaeter (2008) . At the same time as the difference between the top marginal tax rates on labour and capital increased during the 1990ies increased, it also became easier to legally participate in income shifting between the tax bases through more lenient regulations within the split model. There was a period of strong economic growth throughout the 1990ies, and this accounts for part of the increased dividend payments throughout the period. Also, the lowering of marginal tax rates on capital income spurred savings in the household sector. To the extent that these savings were channeled into the corporate sector, this can explain some of the increase in dividends. But a lot of this dividend growth can also be attributed to changing economic incentives for the firms through the introduction of the dual income tax in 1992 13 , as discussed by Alstadsaeter, Fjaerli and Thoresen (2006) . The dramatic reduction of top marginal tax rates on capital income through this reform made retained earnings relatively more expensive as a source of finance compared to debt than before the 1992 tax reform. Also, the incentives to re-label labour income of the owners as dividend income probably contributed strongly to this trend of increased dividend receipts by the households.
owners. After only a couple of years that changed, enabling a tax free intergenerational transfer from parents to adult children through dividend payments to aged children as passive owners in the family firm. 13 A remission of postponed taxes that released large funds in the corporations also contributed to the increase in dividends. The shareholder income tax ensures equal tax treatment of all personal owners of corporations, independent of ownership composition. Only the equity premium is subject to taxation under this new system. The risk-free return to the share, the so-called 
The neutrality of dividend and capital gains taxation
In a simple setting where we disregard uncertainty, we will now show that both under the preand post-reform dual income tax systems, the after-tax income of an individual investor is 14 For the income year 2006.
11 independent of whether profits are distributed or retained in the corporation, then generating a realizable capital gain. Also, neither of the tax systems should affect the timing of dividends or the corporations' choice between debt and equity. First we describe the former system based on imputation credits and then the present shareholder income tax based on rate of return allowances. We do not include the split model in this set-up, as the imputed taxable labour income under the split model is calculated based on gross profit and the value of real assets, and is independent of whether net profits are paid as dividends or retained. Apart from the value of assets in place, the value, V, of a corporation immediately before the ex-dividend date is assumed to be the sum of the current period's dividend payments, D, and after tax profits
where π is gross profits, and τ is the corporate tax rate. Assume that one additional unit of retained earnings increases the value of the share, and thus also realizable capital gains, G, by one unit. When denoting the individual's tax payments on dividends and capital gains by T D and T G , respectively, the value of the corporation can be
The individual's tax payments on dividends and capital gains were both based on a full imputation system, as described in the previous section. The imputation rate for taxable
, and the nominal imputation amount for capital gains (deductions in capital gains for the retained after-tax profits under the RISK-model), I G , is given by
. Actually, the deduction I G includes all accumulated retained earnings in the past, but in this simple setting I G is simply equal to the current period's retentions. Both dividend income and capital gains are taxed according to the capital income tax rate, k t , which is identical to the corporate tax rate. Total tax payments on dividends and capital gains are then given by
and 15 The mechanisms in the shareholder income tax are illustrated in Sørensen (2005a) , Jacobsen (2008) , and Alstadsaeter, Fjaerli and Thoresen (2006) .
The imputation system for dividend taxation is based on the presumption that dividends paid should not be related to income that is not yet taxed according to the tax rules for income accrual. Thus, if dividends paid one year exceed after tax profits, a correction income of
is added to taxable corporate profits that year. The correction income is carried forward and deducted against future taxable profits in the corporation, provided that after tax profits minus dividends in the future is greater than or equal to the correction income carried forward. Thus, the correction income represents only an intertemporal shift in tax payments for the corporation with no permanent effect on the total tax liability of the firm. Note that the correction tax is remitted by the corporation, and not by the individual. When dividends paid exceed after tax book profits, the I G is not reduced as there will be an "income" of
added to taxable profits. As we shall show below in section 3.3.3, this special arrangement created a loophole in the transition from the imputation system to the new system.
The full imputation of taxes paid by the corporation and the tax credit for retained earnings ensure that tax payments on received dividends, T D, and capital gains, T G, are both zero for the individual, except in special circumstances, such as windfall gains or when dividends are received from foreign companies. Also, the corporate tax rate equals the individual tax rate on interest income and interest expenses. Consequently, the after-tax return on savings is the same in the corporate sector and in the household sector, and the dividend decision is independent of taxes.
With no double taxation of dividends and no tax on capital gains from retained profits, the total tax rate on equity is the same as the tax rate on interest income, and equal for all types of investors. Thus, under full certainty, there will be no tax-favouring of different sources of funds and the tax system does neither affect the corporations' choice of debt versus equity nor the investors' portfolio choice. 17 Finally, let us consider the investment decision. The real interest rate r represents the investors' pre-tax required rate of return, and the pre-tax marginal rate of return corporate 16 The neutrality of the dual income tax and the shareholder income tax are also analyzed by Sørensen (1998 Sørensen ( , 2005 , and by Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) on the trade-off between human and non-human capital. 17 The capital gains tax will reduce the equity premium, but will also reduce the after-tax risk under uncertainty.
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investments is represented by F'. In the presence of taxes, the investment condition is given
As the corporate tax rate equals the individual tax rate on capital income, we see from (4) that the investment condition reduces to r F = ' , which means that the individual's investment decision is independent of taxes under the dual income tax with full imputation.
The shareholder income tax.
The tax rate on individual capital income and capital gains, k t , is still equal to the corporate tax rate, τ , as under the full imputation system. Allowances in both taxable gains and taxable dividends are made for the alternative return to the investment, and the RRA is defined as
, where * r is the imputation rate and K is the stepped-up basis of the share. Dividend payments are not taxable for the individual until they exceed the RRA. Total tax on shareholder income is given by T:
Similar to the imputation system, the shareholder model too is based on the presumption that the dividends paid are already taxed at the hand of the corporation. Thus, the correction tax is continued after the tax reform. However, the correction tax has the same implications under the two systems and is relevant only for the working of the special transitional regulations that will be explained in section 3.3.3.
As we see from equation (5), tax on shareholder income is independent of whether profits are distributed to owners as dividends or retained in the corporation and generating a realizable capital gain.
The shareholder income tax is also neutral regarding the timing of dividends, as we clearly see by considering this in a simple two-period setting. Assume that first period profits are not paid in full as dividends, and dividend payments are less than the RRA, such that 
The first line of (6) is the second period value of dividends paid in the first period. The second line represents first period retained earnings that have generated after-tax interest income in the firm and that are distributed as dividends in the second period. The third line represents the individual's total tax payments on received dividends in the two periods. No dividend taxes apply in the first period, as dividends are less that the RRA. The first part of line three of (6) is dividend tax payments in period 2 if all dividends were subject to the dividend tax.
But the accumulated rate-of-return allowance is tax exempt, and total second period RRA is represented by the tax credit in the second part of the expression in the third line. As is seen from equation (7) below, the individual's total income is independent of the timing of dividend payments, 0 / 1 = dD dY , as long as the imputation rate is the after-tax interest rate and the corporate tax rate equals the capital income tax rate,
So, the net value of the stream of dividends is independent of the timing of dividends under the shareholder income tax. Since only the returns in excess of the after tax interest rate is subject to the tax, the investor will also be indifferent between holding debt and holding equity, from a pure tax point of view.
As shown by Sørensen (2005a) , the shareholder income tax is neutral with respect to investment decisions and risk taking, as long as there is full loss offset. He also shows that the RRA in combination with the stepped-up basis of the share ensures neutrality with respect to financing by new equity versus debt. 
The transition from the imputation system to the RRA system and incentives for intertemporal income shifting
Contrary to the steady state financing decisions under each of the two tax systems, the transition from the imputation based system to the new system based on RRA implies temporary tax incentives for shifting income between the two periods. Since the average tax rate in the individual investor's dividend income after the 2006 tax reform approaches the marginal rate of about 48 percent while the average and marginal tax rates before the reform was 28 percent, stock-owners would wish to have as much as possible of their planned dividends taxed before the tax increase came into effect. This is particularly true if the indivudals expected a further increase in the tax on shareholder income in the future, such as the introduction of a general dividend tax through the removal of the RRA.
In order to better understand the incentives to shift income between periods, we will now compare total taxes on profits distributed as dividends on corporate and personal level before and after the reform and we explain two sources of tax arbitrage. These are arbitrage by changes in the cash holdings of corporations and arbitrage by changes in the debt ratios.
Also, we will explain one particular loophole related to the transition regulations. To simplify, we disregard the active owner's choice between paying wages or dividends and assume that the owner-manager initially is rewarded by dividends. We thus assume that all profits, π, are distributed as dividends.
Tax arbitrage by changes in the optimal level of cash balances of capital constrained firms
This type of arbitrage is explained by Korinek and Stiglitz (2008) , where changes in the firms' optimal level of cash on hand leads to temporary increases or reductions in the stream of dividends out of the corporate sector. Their model is based on the assumption that owners discount cash holdings within firms at a higher rate than cash holdings outside the firms because of agency concerns. Another assumption is that it is costly or difficult for corporations to instantaneously raise new external capital, for example due to asymmetric information between firms and outside investors and lending institutions. 18 Consequently, corporations will have to rely on working capital to finance investments and the optimal level of cash holdings is determined by a trade off between the value of cash on the hand of the firm, represented by the future after-tax profits from random investment opportunities, and the value of cash on the hand of the shareholders. The latter depends on the current average tax 16 on dividend receipts, while the former depends on the future tax rates. As long as the dividend tax rates are constant, the optimal cash holding is in steady state and independent of the tax rate on dividends. However, if dividend tax rates are expected to increase in the near future, firms will reduce the level of cash balances in order to have dividends taxed at the current low tax rates rather than after the tax increase. This will also reduce the firms' investments prior to the tax increase. Thus, the major effect of the tax arbitrage is that funds are shifted out of the corporate sector and one would expect to observe a negative correlation between dividend payments and corporations' growth rates after the announcement of a tax increase 19 .
Tax arbitrage by borrowing
Being based on asymmetric information between insiders (management) and outsiders, the Korinek-Stiglitz approach is more relevant for the behavior of large, widely held corporations that rely on the capital market and are subject to these capital market imperfections and agency problems. However, in many firms there will be a "private line"
between the management and a dominant owner or an owner group that resolves the agency problems. A substantial part of the corporate sector consists of closely held corporations where the owner(s) and the management are one and the same. In a closely held corporation, dividends can be taken out of the firm at the low tax rate and then immediately reinvested as new equity that can be repaid to the owners at a later point in time (repayment of original equity is normally tax exempt).
In this section we focus on intertemporal income shifting in an owner-managed firm through borrowing. Assume that the shareholder maximises the present value of after-tax dividends in period 1, which is the last period of the old tax system with no tax on dividends, plus period 2, which is the first period of the new tax system with a tax on dividends above the RRA. Also assume that the shareholder normally would receive dividends K r D ⋅ > * 2 after the tax reform, named period 2. This means that the shareholder expect to have a positive taxable dividend income in period 2, in other words D 2 can be interpreted as dividends that exceeds the RRA in period 2. Denote the personal tax rate on interest income and on dividends after the tax reform by t k and the corporate tax rate by τ, as in equation (5) above. Before the tax reform, in period 1, the maximum dividend that can be paid out is 18 Myers and Majluf (1984) . 19 For further details of the model, we refer the reader to Korinek and Stiglitz (2008) .
In expression (8), M 1 denotes cash on hand after investments are made in period 1 and includes this period's after tax profits, B 1 denotes additional debt beyond the investment needs in period 1 and T πc denotes the temporary tax on correction income. As explained above, T πc is positive if dividends are paid out of income that is not yet taxed by the taxdefined rules for income accrual, and it will be reversed in the future (period 2) when dividend payments are reduced sufficiently below after-tax profits. In period 2, the loan B 1 plus interest expenses are repaid by retained profits and the correction tax is negative. The maximum net dividend in excess of the RRA is
Given a total budget constraint of M 1 + π 2 (1-τ), the period 1 present value of maximum total dividends in the two periods is
where β is the discount factor [1 + (1-t k ) r] -1 . Provided that all additional borrowing in period 1 is used to finance additional dividends (for a given level of investments), the effect on D from borrowing is given by
In (11), the tax rate τ πc takes the value τ if the dividend payment in period 1 triggers correction tax, zero otherwise. The intuition of (11) is that one additional unit of dividends paid in period 1 reduces gross dividends in period 2 by one plus the after-tax interest expenses. Due to the dividend tax, net dividends in period 2 is only reduced by (1-t k ) times the gross dividends. In addition, there will eventually be a cost related to the negative tax credit associated with a possible correction tax. The after-tax value of this cost is increased by the discount factor β and by the dividend tax (provided that the correction tax refund in period 2 is paid out to the owners).
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Since t k =τ, (11) reduces to
Initially, the owners can save the entire dividend tax of t k by shifting income from period 2 to period 1 by borrowing. This implies that investments are financed by debt rather than equity.
However, increasing period 1 dividends beyond period 1 taxable income can lead to a correction tax that is refunded later, in period 2. The correction tax refund increases the tax base for period 2 dividend taxation when paid out. So, for the owners the net after tax value of the correction tax is higher than the after-tax value of the correction tax refund. On the other hand, taxation of interest income reduces the after-tax discount rate and increases the present value of the refund. The expression (12) is always positive even when there is a correction tax, and the tax arbitrage should continue to the D 2 equals the RRA, or to a point where it will be prevented by non-tax legal regulations or capital market constraints.
Tax arbitrage by utilizing legal loopholes
The main purpose of the tax reform was to stop income shifting between the labour and capital income tax bases without worsening the conditions for investment and economic growth. Thus, the corporate sector was given generous transition rules, such as the opportunity to organize investment activities in tax-exempt holding companies. Another transition rule allowed the tax-payers to add the imputation amount I G for capital gains (see the discussion of equations (2) and (3) above) to the starting value for the base for calculation of the RRA. Increasing dividends before the tax reform reduces I G proportionally and this transition rule was intended to make it unnecessary for corporations and owners to withdraw previously earned and taxed equity from the from the corporations just to insert it again the next day as new equity and as such a part of the RRA calculation base. Instead, the earned equity, represented by the imputation amount I G , could be put directly into the base for calculation of RRA. However, due to the interaction with the correction tax arrangement, a special loophole emerged as the full details of the shareholder income tax were revealed for the tax planners during 2004. The loophole works as follows:
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As explained above, when dividends exceed taxable profits, the corporation is assigned a correction income of
. The calculated correction income is considered taxable income, so the capital gains imputation amount changes by the amount
. So, beyond the point
payments will not reduce the I G and the base for the calculation of RRA. However, when inserted back into the firm, the additional dividends will increase the starting value for the RRA-base and in this way, the previously earned equity is used twice to increase the base for the RRA 20 . Similar to the borrowing arbitrage in (12) above, there will be a present-value cost from this operation related to the correction tax, but the net gain from this transaction is still positive.
Summary of income shifting incentives
While the cash balance effect predicts a negative impact of the tax reform announcement on growth, the incentives inherent in (12) According to a official statement from the tax authorities, the dividends did not need to be actually paid out, only set aside and then converted to new equity. Thus no liquidity was needed as long as the firm could render probable that it was solid enough that it could have borrowed the funds needed.
20
negative correlation could also be explained by the view that growing corporations generally prefer retained earnings.
Empirical analysis
In this section we examine the dividend policy of the firms prior to the tax reform and just after its implementation, and the implications of dividend policy for financial structure. Chetty and Saez (2005) point out that mean dividends to a large extent are driven by few top tax payers, which could make statistical inference about the dividend policy difficult from a small sample. They therefore look upon initiations and terminations of dividend payments on the extensive margin, and on changes in dividends paid by dividend paying firms on the intensive margin. With our data that covers more than half of the corporate sector, this is not a major problem. In our analysis we look at initiations, terminations and dividend changes as in Chetty and Saez (2005) , but we also analyze dividends in terms of zero vs. positive payments and the frequency of dividends in excess of net after-tax profits.
If excess payments were high prior to the reform and/or there are alternative ways to distribute such as repayment of the original capital or loans given by shareholders, the transition period may take some more time and dividends would grow only slowly the first years after the reform. Our data does not cover a sufficiently long period to tell how dividend policy will be like after the reform.
Regarding the question whether excess dividend payment increases the propensity to become capital constrained or not, this needs to be examined by an analysis of the investment behaviour in corporations over a sufficiently long period. This is beyond the scope of the present paper. What we examine here is whether distributed profits are replaced by new 21 equity or by debt, and whether there is a negative correlation between excess dividend payments and asset growth. Of course, such a negative correlation does not prove that dividends come at the expense of growth, but would give an indication of the importance of retained earnings as a source of funds for growing firms. The importance of retained earnings and sufficient financial slack is a necessary condition for capital constraints to be a possible obstacle for investments. No negative correlation between dividends and growth would indicate that firms can easily finance growth by external funds (debt or new share issues).
As discussed earlier, there are two simultaneous income shifting incentives inherent in the announced dividend tax. First, the incentive to shift income between periods and to pay extraordinary dividends in the years prior of 2006. Second, the reduced incentive to shift income between tax bases with the introduction of the shareholder income tax, that is, from the labour income tax base to the capital income tax base. The first effect is the focus of this paper. We do not have information on owner's wage payments to themselves. But, we would expect owners to pay more wages after 2006. This since the difference in the marginal tax rates in labour and capital income decreases, and also since there is an additional pension motive for receiving wage payments, as documented by Fjaerli and Lund (2001) .
Data
The empirical documentation is based on two major data sources. The Accounting Register 
Descriptive statistics
There were strong timing effects in dividend payments prior to the introduction of the 2006 shareholder income tax, as shown in figure 1 and Source: Statistics Norway, Accounting Register.
The above factors also have contributed to a changing ownership structure. The reduction in dividends after the implementation of the reform is expected and can be explained by two factors. One is the pure timing effect, as the corporations accelerate their dividend payments prior to the reform. This is only a transitory effect. The other reason is that closely held corporations either find substitutes for dividend payments such as hiding consumption expenditures into the operating expenses of their firm or that they believe that tax rates will drop again in the future. In the meanwhile, the corporation is used more or less as a savings box. This is a more permanent effect.
Dividends do not disappear completely. Dividend payments to foreigners and to corporations are tax exempt, such that one would expect an increase in the use of holding companies and dividend payments to corporations, as also is seen in table 1. But as seen in As indicated by table 3 below, there is a clear tendency for debt-asset ratios to increase in the years prior to the reform in small corporations and in closely held corporations.
In the accounting year 2004, when dividends payments peaked, the debt-asset ratios peaked too, indicating that internal equity to a large extent were replaced by debt. After the sharp 26 drop in dividend payments from the accounting year 2005, we see a rapid decline in the debtasset ratios in smaller and closely held corporations. 
Dividend policy: Extensive margin
Our empirical set up is based on the theoretical models by Sinn (1991) and Korinek and Stiglitz (2008) , where firms start with an initial issue of shares and then grow entirely by internal funds in the first stage. No dividends are paid until the final stage, when each firm reaches its steady state path. Taxes enter the dividend decision through the intertemporal income shifting motive, as discussed in section 3.4.
We are mainly concerned with firms owned by individuals, and in particular closely held firms. In this setting, closely held firms are defined as being fully owned by 5 or less owners. We suppose that owner-managers are impatient in the sense that they discount their dividend income with a subjective discount factor which is smaller than the market discount factor. Typically, this occurs when individuals expect their income to grow, but face credit constraints that limit their opportunity to borrow against their future income prospects. 21 On the other hand, capital constrained firms with limited access to the capital market may be forced to keep some financial slack in the firm, in order to be able to undertake valuable investment opportunities. Both the existence of imperfect capital markets and the financially constrained owner's demand for dividend payments imply that firms are capital constrained in equilibrium. 21 In widely held firms, low discount factors for future dividends are explained by agency theories: Shareholders are afraid that selfish managers will spoil the means on bad projects if they are allowed to keep too much of the profits within the firm.
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Empirical model
Define V R as the increments to the owners' value function from the alternative retain all profits, and V D as the value added from the alternative to pay the dividend D 22 . D may possibly come at the expense of real investments or force the firm to increase the share of costly external financing.
Following MacKie-Mason (1990), we define the relative incremental value of retention rather than payout, V, by
V R and V D are not observable, but we observe the corporation's choice given by Y it =1 if the firm i in period t retain all of its profits and Y it =0 otherwise. The probit model to be estimated then rests on the assumption that pr(Y=1) = pr (V>0) 23 , or
The estimates of the parameters are obtained by maximum likelihood. The x's are listed in *) The reference category for ownership is firms that initially are owned by individuals in 2004 and remain owned by individuals. In the regressions on the entire sample, which also include corporations that are owned by other corporations, we also add a dummy for firms that remain owned by corporations (before and after the reform), d05C and d06C.
22 Besides being an important assumption in the corporation life cycle set-up in Sinn (1991) , it is an empirical fact that the dividend decision often involves a discrete choice, as is evident also in our Norwegian data. The amount paid as dividends is considered exogenous in this stylized model, and will in general depend on profits, investment opportunities and the cost of external financing. 23 This is identical to the revealed preference restriction in MacKie-Mason (1990) .
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The model is estimated using different representations of Y:
1. Dividends paid vs. not paid.
2. Excess dividends paid vs. not paid. Excess dividends are defined as dividends>book profits.
3. Dividend initiation (from zero to positive dividends).
Dividend termination (from positive to zero).
In the first two specifications, the reference year is 1999, while the reference year is 2000 in specification 3 and 4. Separate regressions are performed on the total sample and on closely held firms. A corporation is defined as closely held if it is 100 percent owned by 5 or less individuals in the year 2004.
Results
We concentrate the following discussion of the results of the probit regressions on closely held corporations 24 , because this group seems to show the strongest response to timing incentives of the announced dividend tax. These results are reported in 
Retain all profits (dividends=0)
Log likelihood: -154890.5
Excess dividends=0
Log likelihood: -104600.8
Initiation=1
Log likelihood: -80565.9
Termination=1
Log likelihood: -86181. 
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The estimated parameters reported in table 5 are highly significant and show the expected signs. Besides giving support to the view that anticipated tax changes cause intertemporal income shifting, our findings show an extremely strong response in dividend policy after the implementation of the reform. The model set-up with stylized life-cycle behaviour of firms appears to be fairly realistic, with high asset growth increasing the probability of zero dividends and with mature firms being more likely to pay dividends. The
propensity to pay excess dividends shows the same pattern. Besides their self-contained significance as they give some support to the life-cycle theories of corporate financing behaviour, the growth and mature variables also serve as control variables. It is important to be aware that the observed time trend in dividend payments in a balanced panel of firms could capture both tax-motives and natural changes due to more and more firms becoming "mature"
as time passes. We control for this effect by the dummy variable for maturity. The very significant impact of growth on the propensity to retain all profits indicates that retained earnings can be of special importance for the funding of growing firms. Tax However, as we will see in the next section, repayment of original (external) equity may serve as a substitute for dividend payments, at least for some period.
25
Third, in the cases where the owners have utilised the transitional rule that allowed tax-exempt transfer of shares to a tax-exempt holding company, the tax sensitivity of dividend payments, initiations and terminations becomes much lower (the d05O and d06O variables).
When including the entire panel in the regressions, the dummy variable for being owned by a corporation during the entire period also moderate the tax sensitivity (table A.4).
Part of the reduction in dividend payments in closely held corporations after the tax reform could be due to managing owners substituting wages for dividends after the introduction of the shareholder income tax. This effect is documented by Fjaerli and Lund (2001) on the Norwegian 1992 tax reform. We do not have information on this in our data.
30
But as we will show in the following section, the increase in assets after the reform indicates that most reduction in dividend payments are due to increased corporate saving.
Implications of dividend policy for capital structure
The probit regressions reported above indicate that there is a clear negative relationship between asset growth and the propensity to pay dividends. This negative relationship is even more pronounced when we look at the propensity to pay dividends in excess of book profits.
However, it is hard to tell empirically whether excessive dividend payments constrain growth or whether firms with few growth opportunities choose to pay more dividends. If leakage of working capital through dividend distributions is not replaced by new funds, there is a possibility that tax motivated excessive dividend payments could temporarily confine investments. On the other hand, if foregone internal funds are replaced by debt or equity, it is less likely that intertemporal income shifting have important real effects. The replacement of internal funds by debt vs. equity is the other issue we investigate.
From the discussion in 3.3.3 above it is clear that without the rate-of-return allowance (RRA), replacement of internal equity by external funds in the transitional phase should be in the form of low-taxed debt rather than high-taxed equity, except for the accounting year 2005.
With the RRA, business owners should be indifferent between debt and equity. The details of the new tax system was not public knowledge until the government's proposal in early 2004, so if the owners just expected some kind of a tax increase on shareholder income, one should expect a decrease in internal equity and increase in the supply of debt prior to the reform, causing debt-asset ratios to rise. Tables A .5 and A.6 in the appendix provide tests of the differences in financial structure between firms with zero dividends and firms with positive dividends. The difference-in differences estimates comes with 95 percent confidence intervals annual change in debt-asset ratios, for the entire sample and for closely held firms. Also, each of these groups is categorized by size, using book value as a control variable. For all groups and subgroups, there is a significant difference in the annual change in debt ratios for firms that pay dividends and firms that retain all profits.
In order to identify the impact on the balance from dividend payments, we perform linear regressions with OLS, using the nominal change in the different liabilities debt, internal 25 More years of experience with the reform is needed to tell how it will work in the long run.
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(earned) equity and external (new) equity from one year to the next as dependent variables.
As explanatory variables we used time dummies similar to the probit regressions (d01-d06), and time dummies multiplied with the annual change in total assets (∆A As seen from the dummy variables d01-d04 in tables 6, A.7 and A.8, internal equity falls significantly in the years prior to the tax reform. This is in accordance with the pattern of dividend payments reported in the probit-analyses and the frequency tables A.1 and A.2.
Columns 2 and 4 illustrate the significance of excess dividend payments, as the pure time effects are reduced when the dummy variable for dividends in excess of profits is introduced.
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In the accounting year 2004, the impact on internal equity of the dummy variable for year is insignificant when we take into account excess dividends. This is in accordance with the transition rule loophole we mentioned in section 3. Based on the OLS results, it seems reasonable to conclude that dividend payments did lead to a drain of internal equity out of the corporations, according to the tax motive each year. However, the reduction in equity appears to be counteracted by a corresponding increase in debt, indicating that there may not be too much of a problem for the firms to get external funding. However, we do not know which kind of debt this is. It could thus be that part of this increased debt stems from loans from the owners, in other words, a conversion from equity to debt 26 . The replacement of internal equity by debt lead to a significant increase in debt ratios before the tax reform, and as shown by the appendix tables A.5 and A.6, the decision not to pay any dividends cause a significant drop in debt ratios compared to the decision to pay dividends. This holds for firms of different sizes and with different ownership structure.
After the reform, debt is reduced significantly, as seen from the D05 and D06
coefficients. This indicates that retained earnings are used to repay loans, possibly given by the owners. In 2006, external equity also declines, as repayment of original equity is used as a substitute for dividends. This appears to be particularly evident among the large corporations, as seen from table A.8. Moreover, payment of large dividends relative to profits seems to increase the external equity, indicating that the dividends received are reinvested.
Conclusion
This paper describes corporations' early responses to an announced tax reform that is based on theoretical principles that to our knowledge are new and untried in practical shareholder taxation. These principles imply in an elegant way that a more equal taxation of shareholder income and wage income is obtained without introducing investment distortions, undesirable financing incentives or adverse effects on foreign investments. Also, the tax system is compatible with Norway's international obligations through the EU and international tax agreements. Finally, it appears to be more capable of collecting tax revenue from the national corporate sector than the old split model. If successful, the shareholder income tax with RRA 26 There are also other indications that a large proportion of extraordinary dividends were channelled back to the corporations as external equity or debt. New statistic from Statistics Norway based on national accounts estimates that 73 percent of dividends received by households and non-profit organizations in 2005 were reinvested in the corporate sector, either as debt or equity. Also, according to an official statement from the tax authorities allocated dividends did not need to be actually paid out, but could instead be converted directly into debt (to the owner).
could be adopted by other countries too, which makes a closer investigation of the experiment interesting not only with regard to national considerations.
Our most important finding is that the timing of dividend payments appear to be very sensitive to changes in the taxation of shareholders, and that corporations with concentrated ownership have the strongest responses. In addition, extraordinarily high dividend payouts compared to after tax profits have taken place, accompanied by an increase in debt-equity ratios. This trend is especially pronounced among the relatively small and closely held firms.
The timing effect on dividend payments around the introduction of the shareholder relationship between pay-out ratios and asset growth before the reform. There is a possibility that some firms may have balanced tax-motivated equity drain on one hand against the need for funds on the other hand. This invites to further research on the role of retentions as a preferred source of finance and the importance of financial slack, as originally pointed out by Myers and Majluff (1984) and recently by Korinek and Stiglitz (2008) . 
